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A new wave of computerised therapy is under development which, rather than simulating talking therapies, uses bias modification techniques to target the core psychological process underlying anxiety. Such interventions are aimed at anxiety disorders, and are yet to be adapted for co-morbid anxiety in psychosis. The cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigm delivers repeated exposure to stimuli in order to train individuals to resolve ambiguous information in a positive, rather than anxiety provoking, manner. The current study is the first to report data from a modified form of CBM which targets co-morbid anxiety within individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. Our version of CBM involved exposure to one hundred vignettes presented over headphones. Participants were instructed to actively simulate the described scenarios via visual imagery. Twenty-one participants completed both a single session of CBM and a single control condition session in counter-balanced order. Within the whole sample, there was no significant improvement on interpretation bias of CBM or state anxiety, relative to the control condition. However, in line with previous research, those participants who engage in higher levels of visual imagery exhibited larger changes in interpretation bias. We discuss the implications for harnessing computerised CBM therapy developments for co-morbid anxiety in schizophrenia.
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1. Introduction

The prevalence of co-morbid anxiety disorders which occur within individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia has been estimated at 30-85% (Pokos and Castle, 2006). The presence of such anxiety problems is associated with behaviors such as social withdrawal, which contribute to reports of a reduced quality of life (Braga et al., 2005). Recent psychological models of psychosis have highlighted how anxiety processes may be directly associated with the onset and maintenance of some forms of psychotic presentation, such as paranoia (Garety et al., 2001). It is argued that cognitive processes such as scanning for threat, confirmation bias and safety behaviors (removing oneself from a situation perceived to be dangerous) are common within psychosis and serve to maintain perceived threats. Thus anxiety may not only be considered as co-morbid to schizophrenia, rather there may be underlying psychological processes which maintain phenomena associated with both conditions.
It would therefore seem likely that interventions which target the symptoms of anxiety would be beneficial to many individuals who have been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. Such interventions may have a primary benefit in terms of anxiety reduction, but given the potential common underlying processes, secondary benefits may occur within reduced levels of schizophrenic symptomatology. It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of cognitive behavioural therapy protocols developed for use with individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia are directly aimed at the reduction of positive symptoms (Wykes et al., 2008). However, it is of interest to note that cognitive-behavioral interventions specifically aimed at an anxiety problem have provided an indirect benefit for psychotic symptoms (Good, 2002; Dudley  et al., 2005). 
One specific process which has long been associated with anxiety is a cognitive bias within the interpretation of ambiguous information. A negative interpretation bias is defined as a systematic tendency to interpret potentially ambiguous information in a negative rather than benign way (Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000). For example, an individual may suddenly hear a loud noise in their house whilst at home alone. Although there are many possible interpretations of this scenario, anxious individuals tend to be biased towards making a negative interpretation such as ‘there is an intruder in the house’. In comparison, non-anxious individuals may interpret the noise simply as something falling over. Moreover, interpretation bias has now been demonstrated to have a causal effect on anxiety (Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews and Macleod, 2002; Mathews and Macleod, 2005; Salemink et al., 2007a). 
Recent research has focused on the potential to modify negative interpretation biases so that ambiguity is resolved more positively, through the use of new computerized cognitive training techniques (cognitive bias modification: CBM). It has successfully been demonstrated that a single session of CBM can have a significant impact on both interpretation bias and levels of anxiety (Grey and Mathews, 2000; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Holmes et al., 2006; Salemink et al., 2007b), that repeatedly inducing a more benign interpretation bias can reduce trait anxiety (Mathews et al., 2007), and that patients with anxiety disorders can gain symptom reduction from repeated sessions of CBM (Salemink et al., in prep). Healthy individuals have an optimistic, rather than realistic thinking style (Haaga and Beck, 1995). Therefore we have used the term “positive interpretation bias” to reflect the promotion of the optimistic stance that non-anxious and non-depressed individuals take when confronted with ambiguity. 
Other experiments aimed at translating this new technology from the laboratory to the clinic have sought to find the optimal stimuli and instructions for participants.  Holmes et al., (2006) developed overtly positive (rather than just non-anxious) training material, resulting in the first successful test of a standardized intervention for increasing positive interpretation bias. Training instructions to either ‘imagine’ or ‘think about the words and meaning’ have been contrasted (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009). Mental imagery compared to verbal instructions had more powerful effects on emotion (increases in positive affect and decreases in anxiety). Indeed, within the verbal condition state anxiety increased (rather than decreased) over positive training, with an increase in negative bias. Thus, mere exposure to the CBM stimuli was insufficient to bring about benefits for bias and anxiety – rather, the instructions to use an imagery mode of cognitive processing (rather than verbal) are critical. 
Given the significant role of interpretation bias within the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders, clearly, this exciting new technology would have benefits if also applied to treat co-morbid anxiety, for example in schizophrenia. Although the primary clinical target of such an intervention would be anxiety, there are sound theoretical reasons for speculating that any reduction in anxiety would be associated with reduced overall levels of schizophrenic symptomatology. Another advantage of CBM is that it can be delivered via computer, reducing the costs associated with face-to-face talking therapy. Whilst a range of explicit training materials have been developed as part of a ‘metacognitive training’ package for use with individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (Moritz and Woodward, 2007), there are currently no reports of the implicit approach employed within CBM being used with this group.
The current exploratory study employs a single-session of CBM with a sample of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia who are exhibiting significant levels of anxiety, in order to assess the feasibility of such an intervention with this client group. The current CBM aimed to modify an existing negative interpretation bias so that ambiguity is resolved more positively. This is referred to as ‘positive CBM’. The specific aims of the study are to assess a) whether individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia are able to complete a single session of CBM b) whether a single session of CBM can produce benefits in terms of bias and state anxiety within these clients c) whether key aspects of cognitive functioning associated with schizophrenia have an adverse impact on the benefits of CBM and d) whether (as in previous studies) the use of imagery has a positive impact on the benefits of CBM. A single session of CBM was used given that previous studies have demonstrated significant results within this context (Grey and Mathews, 2000; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Holmes et al., 2006; Salemink et al., 2007b).










	The CBM methodology used in the current study was based on previous studies (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009; Blackwell and Holmes, in press). The current CBM for interpretation bias involved the auditory presentation of 100 scenarios to best allow for mental image formation. This contrasts with earlier CBM work which used visual displays of text (Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000). A brief mental imagery training exercise was conducted prior to the presentation of the cognitive training sentences, so as to enhance the extent to which imagery was used. Previous studies have shown this to be a critical ingredient in the procedure (Holmes and Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006). Emotional valence ratings of ambiguous test descriptions were completed both before and after the CBM condition, and were used as a measure of interpretation bias. A state anxiety measure was also completed both before and after the CBM condition.




	Participants were eligible if they were aged 18-65, had a current diagnosis of schizophrenia and were fluent in English. They were excluded if they had a documented learning disability or organic cause for their psychotic experiences. The 21 participants who completed the study were comprised of 15 men and 6 women with a mean age of 43 years (SD = 7.78). A member of the research team (AR) worked with care-cordinators based within local community psychiatric services (South London & Maudsley NHS Trust, London) in order to discuss eligibility criteria and identify potential participants. Those participants who were eligible and provided informed consent were paid a small fee for their participation. Diagnoses were made by independent psychiatrists using DSM-IV criteria. All had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or paranoid schizophrenia. Participants were initially recruited on the basis that their care co-ordinator reported that they suffered from co-morbid anxiety problems and, subsequently, they scored above 40 on the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory. 

2.4 Cognitive Bias Modification Condition

	2.4.1 Positive training paragraphs. One hundred scenarios were used, based on those employed in previous studies (Holmes and Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006). Some of the original scenarios were replaced or modified, so that all the training descriptions were likely to be relevant to the everyday life of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. The descriptions were read aloud in a female voice (each lasting approximately 10 to 15 s) and digitally recorded. During the study they were presented stereophonically via headphones. Each training paragraph contained a situation which was initially ambiguous but was ultimately resolved in a positive way. For example: “You are walking down your street and see a gang of children laughing. As you get nearer you see what they are laughing at, and smile to yourself” (resolution in italics). Note that the initial part of the scenario was designed to be ambiguous and could also be resolved with a negative outcome (e.g. they are laughing at you). All scenarios had more than one potential outcome, and the aim of using the above structure was to train participants to generate positive resolutions of such ambiguous situations that could have otherwise developed in a less favorable way.
The 100 training paragraphs were presented within 4 blocks of 25 scenarios. The order of the presentation of the blocks was randomized, as was the order of presentation of the scenarios within each block. Participants were reminded of the task instructions between each training block in order to compensate for potential memory difficulties.
2.4.2 Mental Imagery Instructions. This included a brief imagery exercise (Holmes and Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006) within which participants were asked to imagine cutting a lemon in order to clarify what was meant by “using mental imagery”. They were then given four (non-emotional) example descriptions and asked to imagine each event as happening to themselves while describing their mental image out loud. A final example was administered using a computer. The experimenter explained that maintaining a focus on their images would help in answering the questions that followed.




The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was used to measure trait and state anxiety. Both the STAI trait and STAI state scales consist of 20 anxiety related items. These widely used measures are reported to have satisfactory reliability and validity (Spielberger et al., 1983).

2.6 Imagery and task-feedback questionnaire. 





2.7.1 Jumping to Conclusions Task. This task involved the experimenter drawing coloured beads from one of two possible jars, with the participant having to decide which jar the experimenter is using. The version of this task that was used is reported by Garety et al. (1991) where further details can be found. Both conditions of the task were employed. Condition 1 produced an outcome based on ‘the number of beads to certainty’. Condition 2 produced outcomes based on the ‘initial certainty’ (mean response to first 3 beads), ‘final certainty’ (response to bead 10), and ‘reaction to disconfirmatory evidence’ (mean of response to bead 9 – bead 8 and of response to bead 4 – bead 3). 
2.7.2 Working Memory Capacity Task. A measure of working memory capacity was obtained through an adapted form of the operation span (O-Span) task (Turner and Engle, 1989).The task includes 42 separate operations, each contributing to a total score. The original task was modified in order to make the mathematical operations simpler, so as to maintain a high level of accuracy within the current population.




Participants first provided their informed consent to the study, followed by demographic information. They then completed the self-report trait anxiety questionnaire (STAI-trait). To counter balance for the order of conditions, they were then assigned to receive either the CBM or the control condition first.
Those assigned to receive the CBM condition completed the STAI state anxiety scale. They then put on headphones and listened to the first set of 10 ambiguous test descriptions, presented in a random order. On completion of each test description, an emotionality rating was given before attending the next test description. After completing the ambiguous descriptions they were given the brief imagery practice exercise. This was followed by the presentation of 100 training descriptions, presented within 4 blocks of 25 each, with a break and reminder of instructions between blocks. The participants then completed a second administration of the 10 ambiguous test descriptions, followed by the imagery and task-feedback questionnaire and a second administration of the STAI state anxiety scale.
Those assigned to the control condition first completed the STAI state anxiety scale, followed by the initial set of 10 ambiguous test descriptions. This was followed by Brixton Test, the jumping to conclusions task and then the O-Span task. Completion of these three tasks was followed by the re-administration of the ambiguous test descriptions and then the STAI state anxiety scale.






Of the 25 participants who started the study, four of these only completed the first condition to which they had been allocated (two in the CBM condition and two in the control condition), and did not return to complete the other condition. Therefore, 21 participants were available for within-subjects comparisons across the conditions, and included in subsequent analyses. Some participants were unable to complete some of the tasks included within the control condition due to finding them too difficult (one in the jumping to conclusion task, two in the working memory task, and three in the Brixton test). There was a mean gap of 8.9 days between the two conditions (range = 3 to 21, SD = 5.5). The mean rating on the Spielberger trait anxiety scale was 50.8 (SD = 3.5). 

3.2 Between Group Analyses

3.2.1 Interpretation bias change. As an index of interpretation bias participants rated the emotional valence of 10 positively resolvable ambiguous paragraphs both pre (time 1) and post (time 2) each condition, see Table 1. The scores were analyzed in a mixed model ANOVA having two within-subjects factors of condition (CBM vs. control) and time (time 1 vs. time 2) and one between-subjects factor of order (CBM – control vs. control – CBM).
There was no main effect of condition, time or order, Fs < 2. No interactions were significant: condition by time, F (1, 19) = 1.76, MSE = 44.7, p = 0.2, η2 = 0.08; condition by order, F (1, 19) = 0.06, MSE = 2.7, p = 0.8, η2 = 0.03; time by order, F (1, 19) = 1.33, MSE = 47.9, p = 0.3, η2 = 0.09.
------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
---------------------------------------------------------

3.2.2 State anxiety ratings. Using a similar mixed-model ANOVA to that described above, there was no main effect of condition, time or order, Fs < 1. There was a significant interaction of condition and time, F (1, 19) = 6.41, MSE = 66.5, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.25. This interaction was decomposed using paired samples t-test of change over time. This showed anxiety change in neither condition reached significance - in the control condition t(20)= 1.68, p = .11;  in the CBM condition, t(20) = 1.26, p = .22. However there was a significant difference in initial state anxiety scores t(20) = 2.17, p = 0.04, but no significant difference at time 2, t(20) = 1.25, p = 0.23. This indicates the interaction was due to a difference in baseline scores rather than the impact of the intervention. No other interactions were significant: condition by order, F (1, 19) = 1.19, MSE = 14.0, p = 0.3, η2 = 0.06; time by order, F (1, 19) = 0.67, MSE = 12.2, p = 0.4, η2 = 0.03.

3.3 Relationship between Interpretation Bias Change and Cognitive Functioning. 

	Correlations between the mean outcome measures of the Brixton test, the jumping to conclusions task and working memory span with the change in interpretation bias within the CBM condition are shown in Table 2. None of the measures of cognitive functioning were significantly related to the change in interpretation bias.

------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
---------------------------------------------------------

3.4 Relationship between Interpretation Bias Change, Perceived Task Difficulty and Use of Imagery. 
Interestingly, there was a significant positive relationship between participants rated use of imagery within every day life and change in interpretation bias within the CBM condition, suggesting that those participants who had a tendency to use mental imagery were more likely to accrue a more positive bias.  The relationship between change in interpretation bias, perceived task difficulty and use of imagery in the CBM condition are reported in Table 3. All other correlations were non-significant, though all imagery ratings indicated a positive direction. 
------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
---------------------------------------------------------
	When considering those participants whose ratings were within the top one-third on the item relating to the ‘use of imagery within every day life’, i.e. a score of 6 or more (N=7), the mean change in interpretation bias was 0.21 (SD =0.59). This is comparable to that reported in previous studies (Holmes et al., 2006).  

3.5 Acceptability of CBM procedures.





The current pilot study is the first to report on the feasibility of the use of a cognitive bias modification of interpretation (CBM) intervention for use with people diagnosed with schizophrenia. In terms of the baseline feasibility of using a computerised CBM procedure with this population, we found that 21 of the 25 participants who volunteered to take part in the study were able to complete the 90 minute session. Self-report of the acceptability of the use of the CBM paradigm was high, with participants finding the procedures moderately enjoyable. However, the use of only a single session in the current study failed to have a significant impact on the change in interpretation bias or state anxiety in our participants. In contrast, single sessions have brought about changes in non-psychotic and anxious samples (Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009).
In order to explore the failure of the training to produce the desired effects, despite participant’s overt compliance with the experimental procedure, bias change was correlated with indices of cognitive functioning. However, no association was found, indicating that the lack of impact of CBM within this sample is not due to problems in reasoning, working memory span or executive functioning. Further, there was no relationship between bias change and the perceived difficulty in completing the CBM procedure.  It is of course possible that the sample size limited the potential power to detect these effects.
However, intriguingly, those who reported a higher use of visual imagery within their daily lives gained more positive changes in interpretation bias. This result is consistent with previous studies which highlight the critical role of imagery within interpretation bias modification (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009). Further, a sub-group of the top third of participants in relation to the use of imagery in their daily lives exhibited a bias change comparable to non-clinical populations (Holmes et al., 2006), and an effect size indicative of a clinically significant impact. Clearly much caution should be placed on results from such a small sub-group. However, they do highlight the need to consider how individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia may differ from the non-clinical population with respect to imagery. There is some evidence that this group may experience an enhanced vividness in their (involuntary) mental imagery, and that this may contribute to hallucinatory experiences (Aleman et al., 2000; Sack et al., 2005). However, these studies are based on the assessment of experiences of imagery after they have occurred, rather than the use of controlled imagery within in an experimental situation. Current participants self-report of the level of imagery used during the CBM procedures was somewhat lower than that reported in a previous non-clinical study (current, M= 6.48, SD = 1.60; Holmes et al, 2006 M = 7.77, SD = 1.42 on a 9 point scale). It may be that some individuals suffering from schizophrenia are less able to engage in the use of controlled imagery for possible future events. This conclusion is supported by a recent study by D’Argembeau et al. (2008) in which individuals with schizophrenia were less able to imagine specific future and past events. The imagery training in the current study may not have been sufficient to produce the imagery skills which may be required to benefit from CBM. The varied level of imagery skill would contribute to the overall non-significant result, and the significant relationship between general use of imagery and change in interpretation bias.
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Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotionality Ratings for Ambiguous Test Descriptions and State Anxiety (STAI) in the CBM and Control Conditions

	CBM condition(n = 21)	Control condition(n = 21)
Measure 	M           SD	M          SD
Mood measures		
   State STAI, time 1	42.81     8.5	44.90     8.9
   State STAI, time 2	44.05     9.5	42.67     10.2
Bias measures		
    Ambiguous test descriptions, time 1	5.90     0.8	5.64     0.8
    Ambiguous test descriptions, time 2	5.57      0.09	5.61     0.09










Change in Interpretation Bias Within the CBM Condition Correlated with Brixton Test, the Jumping to Conclusions Task and Working Memory Span.
	Brixton Test(n = 18)	Working Memory  Span(n = 19)	JTC: BTC(n = 20)	JTC: IC(n = 20)	JTC: FC(n = 20)	JTC: RDE(n = 20)
CBM condition	-0.16	0.10	0.11	0.29	-0.05	-0.03













Change in Interpretation Bias (With the CBM Condition) Correlated With Use of Imagery and Task Difficulty 
Manipulation checks	CBM condition (n = 21)
How difficult was it to listen to the sentences during the session?	0.09
How much of the time did you find it difficult to focus on the task?	0.16
How much (during the session) did you find yourself thinking in images?	0.30
How much did you find yourself thinking in words?	-0.23
How much were you imagining the situation from a bystanders point of view?	0.40
How much were you imagining the situation from a personal point of view?	0.30
In every day life how much of the time would you say that you use images?	0.47*

* p<0.05 (two-tailed)
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